THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE AND
STATE REGULATION OF THE INTERNET: ARE
LAWS PROTECTING MINORS FROM SEXUAL
PREDATORS CONSTITUTIONALLY DIFFERENT
THAN THOSE PROTECTING MINORS FROM
SEXUALLY EXPLICIT MATERIALS?
CHIN PANN1

ABSTRACT
Several states have enacted statutes to protect minors from
harmful or obscene materials disseminated over the Internet, as
well as from pedophiles seeking to use the Internet to lure them into
sexual conduct. State and federal courts have diverged in their
analysis of the Dormant Commerce Clause’s impact on state
regulation in these areas. While state courts have held that the
Dormant Commerce Clause does not invalidate state luring
statutes, federal courts have been consistent in finding state
dissemination statutes unconstitutional. This iBrief summarizes
recent state and federal jurisprudence in this area and concludes
that state courts have not been successful in distinguishing state
luring statutes from federal case law on state dissemination
statutes. Therefore, state courts have prematurely aborted the
Dormant Commerce Clause examination.

INTRODUCTION
¶1
Of the estimated 10 million children who regularly used the Internet
in 2000, the U.S. Department of Justice reported that one in five received a
“sexual approach or solicitation” while online and one in four had “an
unwanted exposure” to graphic sexual images.2 In pursuit of the important
goal of protecting such minors, several states have enacted criminal
prohibitions against the “[d]issemination of material [of a sexual nature]
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that is harmful to a minor by computer”3 over the Internet and against use of
the Internet to communicate with minors with the intent to seduce them.4
Such statutes, known respectively as dissemination statues and luring
statutes, have come under constitutional attack as violations of both the First
Amendment and the Dormant Commerce Clause. This iBrief examines the
Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to these state laws.
¶2
California Associate Justice Alex C. McDonald was among the first
to note the divergent treatment of Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to
these statutes in federal and state courts.5 With one exception, all reported
Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state dissemination statutes have
occurred in federal courts and all such statutes have been declared
unconstitutional.6 Conversely, all reported Dormant Commerce Clause
challenges to state luring statutes have occurred in state courts and such
statutes have been found constitutional.7 Since Justice McDonald’s
3

Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1152 (10th Cir. 1999).
See, e.g., State v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 127 (N.Y. 2000). Dissemination
statutes essentially target sexually explicit materials on the Internet, prohibiting
such things as text, images, video, and other communication which a particular
state has deemed harmful or obscene from reaching that state’s minors. See, e.g.,
Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). Luring
statutes generally aim at criminalizing the conduct of pedophiles who use the
Internet to seek out and entice minors. See, e.g., Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 127-28.
An example of the differences between the two types of statutes can be seen by
comparing the New York dissemination and luring statutes challenged in Am.
Library Ass’n and Foley, respectively. These statutes essentially mirrored each
other in requiring that a person (1) know the “character and content” of his
communication (2) which depicts sexual content “harmful to minors” (3) and
“intentionally use[] any computer communication system” to (4) “initiate or
engage in such communication with a person who is a minor.” See NY CLS
Penal § 235.21 (2005); NY CLS Penal §235.22 (2005). However, the New
York luring statute contains an additional requirement that a person, for personal
benefit, “importunes, invites or induces” a minor to participate in some type of
sexual intercourse, contact, or performance. NY CLS Penal § 235.22. The state
courts see a distinction between criminalizing a person’s communication of and
a minor’s subsequent access of harmful material under a dissemination statute
and criminalizing such communication and access when a person also has the
purpose of seducing a minor. See, e.g., Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr.
2d 453, 472 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
5
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observation, several state and federal courts, including the United States
Courts of Appeal for the Second and Fourth Circuits, have further
entrenched their respective positions regarding the Dormant Commerce
Clause and state regulation of the Internet.
¶3
The procedure by which these cases come into court may shed
some light on the lack of federal court review of state luring statutes and the
lack of state court review of state dissemination statutes. Generally,
because the dissemination cases have resulted from preemptive requests for
injunctions from a multitude of interested parties seeking to protect their
speech, these parties had the initial choice of forum.8 On the other hand, the
state luring cases have resulted from challenges brought by criminal
defendants charged with or convicted of violating the law, thereby dictating
a state court forum.9 Thus, plaintiffs challenging dissemination statutes
have been able to fight them on friendly ground in federal court, whereas
constitutional challenges to luring statutes come from criminal defendants
forced into state court, where they are tainted by the vulgarity of the crimes
they are accused of having committed.
¶4
In finding the state luring statutes constitutional, state courts have
attempted to distinguish these statutes from state dissemination statutes that
the federal courts have found unconstitutional. Whether state dissemination
statutes or state luring statutes are, in fact, constitutional under the Dormant
Commerce Clause is not addressed in this iBrief. Rather, this iBrief asserts
that by failing to consider varying state standards of what constitutes
prohibited conduct and who is considered a minor, state courts have not
been successful in distinguishing state luring statutes from the federal
dissemination cases. Consequently, state courts have too easily found “no
legitimate economic impact” and have therefore prematurely aborted the
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis.

I. THE DORMANT COMMERCE CLAUSE
A. The Genesis and Development of the Dormant Commerce Clause
¶5
The Constitution gives Congress the power to “regulate Commerce
with foreign Nations, and among the several States.”10 This power is
typically referred to as Congress’ Commerce Clause power. Underlying

8

See, e.g., Am. Civil Liberties Union v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1153 (10th
Cir. 1999).
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See, e.g., Foley, 731 N.E.2d at 126. Such cases may still come under federal
court review through the Supreme Court’s discretionary review or upon federal
Habeas Corpus review, but to date neither avenue has resulted in a reported
opinion.
10
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
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this grant of power was a desire to avoid the economic “Balkanization” of
the national economy by the states and to recognize “the importance of the
federal government being able to act in areas that affected the economic
well being of the nation as a whole.”11 In Gibbons v. Ogden,12 the United
States Supreme Court first articulated the principle that the Commerce
Clause contained a dormant aspect which limits the states’ power to
legislate.13 Even without Congressional action, this dormant aspect implies
that states may not discriminate against or unduly burden interstate
commerce.14 Despite this implied limitation, the Court has recognized on
many occasions that the states still retained many of their traditional police
powers. 15 Thus, where Congress has not regulated commerce, “courts are
left to balance the need for laws that allow commerce to freely occur
between the states against the power of the states to regulate matters that
affect the health, safety, and security of their citizens.”16
In the years since Gibbons, the Dormant Commerce Clause
jurisprudence has gone through several iterations as the Court has attempted
to articulate what differentiates permitted and prohibited state regulation.17
The Court’s current jurisprudence has distinguished between those state
laws that plainly discriminate against interstate commerce and those state
laws that, while neutral, impose a burden upon interstate commerce.18 Laws
that discriminate against “out-of-staters” and which represent a form of
¶6

11

Michael W. Loudenslager, Allowing Another Policeman on the Information
Superhighway: State Interests and Federalism on the Internet in the Face of the
Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 BYU J. PUB. L.191, 208-09 (2003) (citing S.
Cent. Timber Dev. v. Wunnicke, 467 U.S. 82, 92 (1984); Quill Corp. v. N.
Dakota, 504 U.S. 298, 312 (1992)).
12
22 U.S. 1 (1824).
13
See, e.g., Michelle Armond, Note, Regulating Conduct on the Internet: State
Internet Regulation and the Dormant Commerce Clause, 17 BERKELEY TECH.
L.J. 379, 380 (2003).
14
Jack L. Goldsmith & Alan O. Sykes, The Internet and the Dormant
Commerce Clause, 110 YALE L.J. 785, 788 (2001).
15
Loudenslager, supra note 11, at 209 (citing Maine v. Taylor, 477 U.S. 131,
151 (1986); H.P. Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 531-32 (1949);
Henderson v. Mayor of N.Y., 92 U.S. 259, 271 (1875); New York v. Miln, 36
U.S. (10 Pet.) 102, 133 (1837)).
16
Id. at 209-10 (citing Healy v. Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335-37 (1989); H.P.
Hood & Sons, Inc. v. Du Mond, 336 U.S. 525, 533 (1949); S. Pac. Co. v.
Sullivan, 325 U.S. 761, 768-69 (1945)).
17
Peter C. Felmly, Comment, Beyond the Reach of States: The Dormant
Commerce Clause, Extraterritorial State Regulation, and the Concerns of
Federalism, 55 ME. L. REV. 467, 472-75 (2003) (explaining the “local-national
scheme” and the “direct-indirect analysis” once used by the Court).
18
See, e.g., Brown-Forman Distillers Corp. v. N.Y. State Liquor Authority, 476
U.S. 573, 579 (1986).
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economic protectionism are at the core of prohibited state regulation,
commanding the strictest level of scrutiny.19

B. Facially Neutral Laws Under the Dormant Commerce Clause
¶7
State laws that do not discriminate against nonresidents may still
violate the Dormant Commerce Clause. Three lines of analysis are
presently used by the courts to evaluate the constitutionality of these
statutes. The Court’s current test, first articulated in Pike v. Bruce Church,
Inc., balances the local benefits provided by the law against the burdens it
imposes upon interstate commerce:20

Where the statute regulates even-handedly to effectuate a legitimate
local public interest, and its effects on interstate commerce are only
incidental, it will be upheld unless the burden imposed on such
commerce is clearly excessive in relation to the putative local benefits.
If a legitimate local purpose is found, then the question becomes one
of degree. And the extent of the burden that will be tolerated will of
course depend on the nature of the local interest involved, and on
whether it could be promoted as well with a lesser impact on interstate
activities.21
¶8
However, Dormant Commerce Clause analysis of a state law does
not end with the Pike test. The Court has also “invalidate[d] state
legislation on the ground that it regulates extraterritorially.”22 In Healy v.
The Beer Inst., the Court articulated a three-prong analysis to determine
whether a state law regulates outside the state’s borders:

First, the ‘Commerce Clause . . . precludes the application of a state
statute to commerce that takes place wholly outside of the State’s
borders, whether or not the commerce has effects within the State’ . . .
. Second, a statute that directly controls commerce occurring wholly
outside the boundaries of a State exceeds the inherent limits of the
enacting State’s authority and is invalid regardless of whether the
statute’s extraterritorial reach was intended by the legislature. . . .
Third, the practical effect of the statute must be evaluated not only by
considering the consequences of the statute itself, but also by
considering how the challenged statue may interact with the legitimate

19

Goldsmith & Sykes, supra note 14, at 788 (citing CTS Corp. v. Dynamics
Corp. of Am., 481 U.S. 69, 87 (1987)).
20
Pike v. Bruce Church, Inc., 397 U.S. 137, 142 (1970).
21
Felmly, supra note 17, at 482 (quoting Pike, 397 U.S. at 142 ) (internal
citations omitted).
22
See, e.g., Healy v. The Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 335-40 (1989) (discussing the
Supreme Court’s prior extraterritoriality jurisprudence).
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regulatory regimes of other states and what effect would arise if not
one, but many or every, State adopted similar legislation.23
¶9
Finally, many of the Court’s Dormant Commerce Clause decisions
have invalidated state statutes that potentially subject an area of interstate
commerce to inconsistent state regulation.24 Some courts have cited these
cases in decisions concerning state regulation of the Internet, asserting that
“certain areas of regulation are so integral to interstate commerce that they
require the uniformity throughout the country that only federal legislation
can provide.”25 But while the Supreme Court has invalidated some state
statutes concerning highways and railways based upon inconsistent state
regulation, it has done so while showing deference to the important safety
function of such statutes, noting that “[t]hese safety measures carry a strong
presumption of validity when challenged in court.”26 The Court has
emphasized the “peculiarly local nature of [the] subject of safety, and ha[s]
upheld state statutes applicable alike to interstate and intrastate commerce,
despite the fact that they may have an impact on interstate commerce.”27
¶10
Of the three lines of analysis described above, the Pike balancing
test is the most clearly articulated by the Court. Some commentators
believe that extraterritorial effect and inconsistent state legislation are
merely facets of the Pike balancing test, where the burdens upon interstate
commerce are still weighed against the local benefits provided.28 Others
have treated extraterritorial effect and inconsistent state legislation as
separate and distinct tests from Pike balancing.29 As will be shown below,
courts evaluating the constitutionality of state dissemination and luring
statutes have usually either adopted the latter opinion or have not addressed
the issue at all.

23

Healy, 491 U.S. at 336-37.
See, e.g., Bibb v. Navajo Freight Lines, Inc., 359 U.S. 520, 526-27, 529-530
(1959) (striking down a state highway regulation); S. Pac. Co. v. Sullivan, 325
U.S. 761, 779-82 (1945) (striking down a state railroad regulation).
25
Loudenslager, supra note 11, at 219 (citing Am. Civil Liberties Union v.
Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999); Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F.
Supp. 160, 163 (S.D.N.Y. 1997)).
26
Bibb, 359 U.S. at 524, 530. See also Raymond Motor Transp., Inc. v. Rice,
434 U.S. 429, 443-44 (1978).
27
Bibb, 359 U.S. at 523.
28
See, e.g., Armond, supra note 13, at 381.
29
See, e.g., Loudenslager, supra note 11, at 215 (stating that exterritorial effect
is a per se Commerce Clause violation).
24
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II. THE FEDERAL COURT DECISIONS ON STATE DISSEMINATION
STATUTES
A. American Library Association v. Pataki
¶11
The leading federal dissemination case is American Library
Association v. Pataki,30 which concerned a Dormant Commerce Clause
challenge to a New York dissemination statute.31 The court held that the
statute was unconstitutional because (1) it impermissibly gave New York
jurisdiction over conduct occurring wholly outside of the state, (2) the
burdens on interstate commerce exceeded any local benefit, and (3)
legislation of this sort potentially subjects Internet users to a multitude of
inconsistent state regulations. Before reaching these conclusions, however,
the court made a series of observations and findings of fact relevant to the
Dormant Commerce Clause discussion.

The court first noted that Internet users are currently unable to
discern facts relevant to determining whether they are violating the statute,
such as the “age and geographic location” of those they communicate
with.32 According to the court, the Internet was “designed to ignore rather
than document geographic location” and “no aspect of the Internet can
feasibly be closed off to users from another state.”33 Even e-mail
communication between two residents of the same state “may well pass
through a number of states en route” to its destination.34 Furthermore,
Internet features like packet switching35 and catching36 increase the
Internet’s lack of geographic boundaries.37 Lacking an explicit restriction to
intrastate communications, “the [statute] applies to any communication,
intrastate and interstate,” that falls within New York’s criminal
jurisdiction.38 Because the Internet “serves as [a] conduit[]” for many
different types of commercial transactions, the court reasoned that the
¶12

30

969 F. Supp. 160 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). See PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman, 167 F.
Supp. 2d 878, 891 (W.D. Va. 2001), aff’d, 362 F.3d 227 (4th Cir. 2004) (noting
that Pataki is the leading case in this area).
31
Id. at 163 (evaluating N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.21 (McKinney 1999)).
32
Id. at 167.
33
Id. at 170-71.
34
Id. at 171.
35
Method of routing messages over the Internet in smaller packets. These
packets are routed over different paths due to the amount of Internet traffic. Id.
36
“Practice of storing partial or complete duplicates of materials from frequently
accessed sites to avoid repeatedly requesting copies from the original server.”
Id.
37
See id.
38
Id. at 169-70.
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Internet, like railroads and highways, “represents an instrument of interstate
commerce.”39
¶13
Based upon those findings, the court held that the New York statute
violated the Dormant Commerce Clause in three ways.40 First, “the
[dissemination statute] represents an unconstitutional projection of New
York law into conduct that occurs wholly outside New York.”41 Because
Internet users who wish to communicate with the public are unable to
exclude New Yorkers from such communication, they are necessarily faced
with the prospect of falling under the statute’s jurisdiction.42 This may
cause otherwise legal conduct in the user’s location to be subject “to
prosecution in New York and thus subordinate the user’s home state’s
policy – perhaps favoring freedom of expression over a more protective
stance – to New York’s local concerns.”43 Accordingly, the court held that
the statute unconstitutionally regulated in an extraterritorial manner.
¶14
Second, the court reasoned that “although protecting children from
indecent material is a legitimate and indisputably worthy subject of state
legislation, the burdens on interstate commerce resulting from the [statute]
clearly exceed any local benefit derived from it.”44 In defining the local
benefit, the court noted that the statute could not prevent the dissemination
of harmful materials from international sources and that there would be
“practical difficulties” with prosecuting domestic violators “whose only
contact with New York occurs via the Internet.”45 Noting that New York
had other existing laws intended to protect minors from similar evils, the
court stated that the benefit “is therefore confined to that narrow class of
cases that does not fit within the parameters of any other law.”46
¶15
Balanced against this relatively minor benefit was the “extreme
burden on interstate commerce” resulting from the statute’s global reach, its
“chilling effect” on Internet users, “the broad range of Internet
communications potentially affected by the [statute],” and the excessive
“costs associated with Internet users’ attempts to comply with the terms of
the defenses that the [statute] provides.”47 The court therefore held that the

39

Id. at 173.
Id. at 169.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 177.
43
Id.
44
Id. at 169.
45
Id. at 178.
46
Id. at 179.
47
Id. at 179-80.
40
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statute struck an unconstitutional balance, finding the burdens “severe” and
the benefits “attenuated.”48
¶16
Finally, the court felt the Internet should be an area of commerce
that is “marked off as a national preserve to protect users from inconsistent
legislation that, taken to its most extreme, could paralyze development of
the Internet altogether.”49 Internet users, lacking an ability to wall off a
certain state’s residents, could potentially fall under the regulation of all
states.50 The court therefore reasoned that “[r]egulation by any single state
can only result in chaos, because at least some states will likely enact laws
subjecting Internet users to conflicting obligations.”51 Hence, even identical
statutes would leave individuals “subject to discordant responsibilities”
because there are no national standards on what constitutes harmful
materials.52

Thus, Pataki invalidated the New York dissemination law on all
three grounds which the Supreme Court has established as the basis for
Dormant Commerce Clause violations: as an excessive burden on
commerce with little local benefit, as an impermissible extraterritorial
regulation, and as a regulation introducing the possibility for inconsistent
legislation.
¶17

B. Subsequent Federal Cases
A number of federal circuit and district courts have since
considered the constitutionality of dissemination statutes and many have
adopted the reasoning in Pataki. For example, the Tenth Circuit in ACLU v.
Johnson53 held, following Pataki, that a New Mexico statute represented an
unconstitutional extraterritorial projection of state policy, an impermissible
balance of the local benefits derived versus the burdens imposed on
interstate commerce, and an imposition of “inconsistent state regulation” on
an area that requires national regulation.54 In Cyberspace Communications,
Inc. v. Engler, the Sixth Circuit also adopted Pataki in declaring that a
Michigan dissemination law violated the Dormant Commerce Clause as an
unconstitutional projection of Michigan policy beyond its borders.55
¶18

48

Id. at 181.
Id. at 169.
50
See id. at 183.
51
Id. at 181.
52
Id. at 182.
53
194 F.3d 1149 (10th Cir. 1999).
54
Id. at 1160-61 (evaluating N.M. STAT. ANN. § 30-37-3.2(A)).
55
Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler, 142 F. Supp. 2d. 827, 830-31
(E.D. Mich. 2001) (evaluating MICH. COMP. LAWS § 772.675 (2002)). The
court in Engler did not address either the inconsistent state regulation of the
49
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The Second Circuit in American Booksellers Foundation v. Dean
held that a Vermont dissemination statute similarly represented an
impermissible projection of state policy.56 The court specifically stated that
the Internet’s lack of “geographic boundaries” makes it “difficult, if not
impossible, for a state to regulate internet activities without ‘projecting its
legislation into other States.’”57 However, the court did note that “the
extraterritorial effects of internet regulations differ from [traditional]
extraterritorial-regulation cases ” in that “internet commerce does not quite
‘occur wholly outside [Vermont’s] borders.’”58 But the court also noted
that “at the same time that the internet’s geographic reach increases
Vermont’s interest in regulating out-of-state conduct, it makes state
regulation impracticable.”59 Agreeing with Pataki, the court viewed the
Internet as likely to “soon be seen as falling within the class of subjects that
are protected from State regulation because they ‘imperatively demand[] a
single uniform rule,’” but did not hold the statute unconstitutional
specifically on that basis.60
¶19

In the context of a motion to dismiss for lack of standing, the court
in Southeastern Booksellers Association v. McMaster recognized that a
South Carolina dissemination law “arguably violate[d] the Commerce
Clause in at least two ways: (1) it constitute[d] an unreasonable and undue
burden on interstate and foreign commerce; and (2) it subject[ed] interstate
use of the Internet to inconsistent state regulation.”61
¶20

¶21
The Fourth Circuit in PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman invalidated a
Virginia dissemination statute as a violation of the Dormant Commerce
Clause based upon a balance of benefits and burdens under the Pike test.62
As the Second Circuit did in Dean, the court here noted that the Internet’s

Internet or the impermissible balance of benefits versus burdens prongs of the
Dormant Commerce Clause analysis. See id. Those prongs, however, were
addressed in a prior proceeding concerning the granting of a preliminary
injunction against the statute. See Cyberspace Communications, Inc. v. Engler,
55 F. Supp. 2d. 737, 752 (E.D. Mich. 1999), aff’d and remanded by, 238 F.3d
420 (6th Cir. 2000) (noting the burdens of the law outweighed the benefits and
statutes of this type “would subject the Internet to inconsistent regulations across
the nation”).
56
Am. Booksellers Found. v. Dean, 342 F.3d 96, 104 (2d Cir. 2003) (evaluating
13 V.S.A. § 2802 (1998)).
57
Id. at 103 (quoting Healy v. The Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 334 (1989)).
58
Id. (quoting Healy, 491 U.S. at 332).
59
Id. at 104.
60
Id., (quoting Cooley v. Bd. of Wardens, 53 U.S. 299, 319 (1852)).
61
Southeast Booksellers Ass’n v. McMaster, 282 F. Supp. 2d 389, 396 (D.S.C.
2003).
62
PSINET, Inc. v. Chapman, 362 F.3d 227, 240 (4th Cir. 2004) (evaluating VA.
CODE ANN. § 18.2-391 (Michie Supp. 1999) (amended 2000)).
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nature made a construction of the statute amenable to the extraterritorial
projection analysis “nearly impossible.”63
¶22
Together, these cases spanning five federal circuits represent the
current federal jurisprudence on Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to
state dissemination statutes. Such state statutes have been held to be either
one or all of the following: an impermissible burden under the Pike
balancing test, an unconstitutional projection of state policy
extraterritorially, and an inappropriate subjection of interstate commerce to
inconsistent state regulation.

III. THE STATE COURT DECISIONS CONCERNING STATE LURING
STATUTES
A. New York
¶23
The New York Court of Appeals was the first state court to consider
whether the Dormant Commerce Clause is a barrier to state luring statutes,
and specifically whether such statutes “unduly burden interstate trade.”64
Even though both dissemination and luring statutes could be characterized
as regulating the Internet, the court in State v. Foley held that the New York
luring statute did “not discriminate against or burden interstate trade; it
regulate[d] the conduct of individuals who intend to use the Internet to
endanger the welfare of children.”65 In distinguishing Pataki, the court
found the luring prong of the statute “a significant and distinct feature.”66
The court was “hard pressed to ascertain any legitimate commerce that is
derived from the intentional transmission of sexually graphic images to
minors for the purpose of luring them into sexual activity” and noted that
the conduct prohibited by the statute “is of the sort that deserves no
‘economic’ protection.”67

B. California
Hatch v. Superior Court68 represents a more thorough analysis of
Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to state luring statutes. In reference
to Pataki’s assertion that the Internet requires national regulation, the court
¶24

63

Id.
State v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 132 (N.Y. 2000).
65
Id. (evaluating N.Y. PENAL LAW § 235.22 (McKinney 1999)).
66
Id. at 126.
67
Id. at 133. In a subsequent case later that year, a New York appellate court
overturned a lower court’s ruling that the same statute violated the Dormant
Commerce Clause, citing Foley as precedent. State v. Barrows, 709 N.Y.S.2d
573, 574-75 (N.Y. App. Div. 2000).
68
Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
64
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distinguish the California law, stating that rather than criminalizing Internet
access or mandating communication tailored to specific jurisdictions, the
statute merely proscribed certain communication when coupled with the
purpose of seducing minors.69 The argument that the communication may
be interstate in nature cannot “be employed . . . to insulate pedophiles from
prosecution simply by reason of their usage of modern technology.”70 The
court refused to consider the Pataki analysis controlling, finding “the intent
to seduce element . . . a distinction of the utmost significance.”71 The court
reasoned:
While a ban on the simple communication of certain materials may
interfere with an adult’s legitimate rights, a ban on communication of
specified matter to a minor for purposes of seduction can only affect
the rights of the very narrow class of adults who intend to engage in
sex with minors. We have found no case which gives such intentions
or the communications employed in realizing them protection under
the dormant commerce clause.72
¶25
Concerning the claim that the statute projected California law
extraterritorially, the court reasoned that state criminal jurisdiction extends
to a person who commits any portion of a crime in-state and that such a
person is punishable as if the crime were committed wholly in-state.73
Additionally, the court stated that “there is no reason to suppose California
would attempt to impose its policies on other states . . . for wholly
extraterritorial offenses” and that “there is no reason at all to assume
California prosecutors will attempt to stifle interstate commerce by filing
charges for acts committed in other jurisdictions, or where only ‘de
minimis’ acts . . . are committed within this state.”74 Based upon this
reasoning, the court concluded that Pataki’s assumption concerning the
extraterritorial projection of state law is “without relevance to [the court’s]
consideration of the statutes.”75

The same California statute was again challenged in People v.
Hsu.76 The court in Hsu stated that while the “Internet is undeniably an
incident of interstate commerce,” an interstate burden does not necessarily
follow from Internet regulation.77 In considering the Pike balancing test, the
court noted difficulty in conceiving what “legitimate commerce [could] be
¶26

69

Id. at 471 (evaluating CAL. PENAL CODE § 288.2 (West 1999)).
Id. (emphasis in original).
71
Id. at 471-72. (emphasis in original).
72
Id. at 472. (emphasis in original).
73
Id.
74
Id. at 472-73.
75
Id. at 473.
76
99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 188 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
77
Id. at 190.
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burdened” and concluded that any burden on interstate commerce “is
incidental at best and far outweighed by the state’s abiding interest in
preventing harm to minors.”78 Regarding a claim of inconsistent regulation,
the court stated that the knowledge requirement as to a person’s status as a
minor and the requirement of “intent to arouse the prurient interest of the
sender and/or minor and with the intent to seduce the minor” was sufficient
to distinguish the California statute from the statute in Pataki because such
a limited proscription does not burden interstate commerce.79 The court
adopted Hatch’s reasoning that when the luring statute “is harmonized with
the entire California penal scheme, it does not effectively regulate activities
beyond California.”80 Together, Hatch and Hsu represent California’s
rejection of Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to its state luring
statute.81
¶27
Beginning in 2003, the courts of North Dakota, Ohio, and Florida
reported decisions rejecting Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to their
states’ luring statutes.82 These states, along with New York and California,
represent the current state court jurisprudence regarding Dormant

78

Id.
Id. at 191 (emphasis in original).
80
Id.
81
Both decisions were followed by a more recent, unpublished California state
court decision, but no significant analysis was added. See People v. Hayne,
2002 Cal. App. LEXIS 2650, at *22-28 (Cal. Ct. App. Mar. 27, 2002).
82
The North Dakota Supreme Court agreed with Foley and Hsu concerning the
lack of legitimate commerce contained within the range of activities prohibited
by the state’s luring statute because of the luring element. State v. Backlund,
672 N.W.2d 431, 438 (N.D. 2003). In State v. Snyder, an Ohio appellate court
concluded that the state’s luring statute was constitutional because it was ”a
valid exercise of police power” that is “narrowly tailored to serve the interest of
the State in promoting the welfare of children.” 801 N.E.2d 876, 886 (Ohio Ct.
App. 2003), appeal denied, 807 N.E.2d 367 (Ohio 2004). Three additional Ohio
state courts examined Dormant Commerce Clause challenges to Ohio’s luring
statute, but none of the cases engaged in analysis of any additional significance.
See State v. Cunningham, 808 N.E.2d 488, 493-94 (Ohio Ct. App. 2004), appeal
denied, 814 N.E.2d 490 (Ohio 2004); State v. Bolden, C.A. Case No. 19943,
2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 2061, at *19-22 (Ohio Ct. App. May 7, 2004); State v.
Anthony, Appeal No. C-030510, 2004 Ohio App. LEXIS 3514, at *14-17 (Ohio
Ct. App. Jul. 23, 2004), appeal allowed, 104 Ohio St. 3d 1408 (Ohio 2004). A
Florida appellate court relied upon a lack of legitimate commerce burdened
under the Pike test and the narrowing effect of the element of intentional
seduction under the inconsistent burden test in holding the statute constitutional
under both analyses. Cashatt v. State, 873 So. 2d 430, 436 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
2004), reh’g denied, No. 1D02-4638, 2004 Fla. App. LEXIS 11358 (Fla. Dist.
Ct. App. Jun. 1, 2004).
79
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Commerce Clause challenges to state luring statutes.83 Foley, Hatch, and
Hsu were decisive in establishing state precedent and subsequent cases have
been consistent in following the reasoning they established. Because
subsequent state courts have been so uniform in following the reasoning of
these three seminal cases, they have effectively ceased any further Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis of state luring statutes.

IV. DISCUSSION OF THE STATE COURTS’ REASONING IN
DISTINGUISHING FEDERAL PRECEDENT
A. Pike Balancing of Local Benefits Against Burdens Upon Interstate
Commerce
¶28
The state courts generally see the intent element of state luring
statutes as a crucial distinguishing factor in upholding their constitutionality
and distinguishing them from state dissemination statutes.84 Claiming that a
requirement of an intent to seduce minors dramatically reduces the potential
range of prohibited conduct, the state courts assert that what residual
conduct remains cannot be characterized as legitimate commerce.85
Therefore, any incidental effect on interstate commerce is inconsequential
when compared with the legitimate state policy of protecting minors.86

However, the state courts have overstated their position when
contending that no legitimate commerce is burdened, as states may have

¶29

83

Two additional state court cases are worth noting. A Florida appellate court in
Simmons v. State, 886 So. 2d 399 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2004), is the only reported
opinion by a state court regarding a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to a
state dissemination statute. Because a “violator who is not in Florida must know
or believe that he or she is transmitting harmful material to a Florida minor,” the
court held that the statute did not “subject[] interstate use of the Internet to
inconsistent state regulation.” Id. at 406. The court stated that “Congress
specifically provides for preemption of state law when it desires” and that there
was no argument made that the statute “is contrary to any federal law or that
federal law so thoroughly occupies the legislative field as to require a reasonable
inference that Congress left no room for it to be supplemented by state law.” Id.
at 406-07. But the court’s discussion of direct conflict and preemption are
confusing as each are distinct constitutional limitations upon the ability of the
states to regulate and the absence of conflict or preemption should not have an
effect upon a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge. In State v. Ansari, a Utah
appellate court also considered a Dormant Commerce Clause challenge to the
state’s luring statute, but that court declined review of the challenge for standing
reasons without reaching the merits of the challenge. 100 P.3d 231, 241-42
(Utah Ct. App. 2004).
84
See, e.g., State v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 126 (N.Y. 2000).
85
See, e.g., People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 190 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
86
See, e.g., id.
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different policies on what conduct is prohibited.87 One commentator noted
that
in many states a nineteen-year-old male may have sexual relations
with a sixteen-year-old female without violating any law. . . .
Moreover, a recent comprehensive survey of the laws in varying states
demonstrates the diversity of age of consent laws throughout the
country. There is not criminal liability for sexual conduct with
children fourteen or older in Hawaii or for sexual conduct with
children fifteen years old or older in Colorado. 88
¶30
Variance in age of consent laws implies that conduct that is legal in
one state might be illegal in another state.89 Hence a blanket assertion that
no burden is imposed upon legitimate commerce by a state luring statute
that regulates conduct on the Internet oversimplifies the analysis because it
fails to recognize the Internet’s global reach and the inability of Internet
users to prevent their communications from reaching a certain state.
¶31
Additionally, the state courts’ definition of the local benefit derived
from a state luring statute requires refinement. Generally, such benefit is
stated as the protection of minors on the Internet from pedophiles.90 While
such a purpose is clearly legitimate and of central concern to the states, this
merely begins the analysis of the local benefit. The existence of other state
laws that provide a similar benefit must also be considered. As noted by the
court in Pataki in its analysis of the New York dissemination statute,

The Act is, of course, not the only law in New York’s statute books
designed to protect children against sexual exploitation. The State is
able to protect children through vigorous enforcement of the existing
laws criminalizing obscenity and child pornography. . . . The local
benefit to be derived from the challenged section of the statute is
therefore confined to that narrow class of cases that does not fit within
the parameters of any other law.91
¶32
The local benefit derived from state luring statutes should thus be
confined to the same narrow class of cases described in Pataki. If a luring
statute is merely redundant, providing the same level of protection or
deterrence provided by other existing state laws that do not affect interstate
87

See McDonald, supra note 5, at 217.
Id.
89
See id. at 216-17.
90
See, e.g., State v. Foley, 731 N.E.2d 123, 126 (N.Y. 2000).
91
Am. Library Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 179 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). In
discussing the benefit, the court did note that the plaintiffs were not challenging
the New York luring statute. Id. But that statement was made in regard to
excluding the conduct prohibited by that statute from the measurement of the
local benefit. Id.
88
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commerce, then the benefit of the law is nonexistent and almost any burden
upon interstate commerce would be difficult to justify.

B. Extraterritorial Effect
¶33
The state courts that have addressed the extraterritorial effects of
state luring statutes have rejected this challenge to their constitutionality for
two reasons: either (1) consideration of the state luring statute in
conjunction with the state’s criminal jurisdiction statutes leads to the
conclusion that the state’s criminal jurisdiction extends only to conduct
which has sufficient connections with the state and therefore no wholly
extraterritorial conduct is ever affected, or (2) no legitimate commerce is
affected and therefore there is no extraterritorial effect. 92

The assertion that no legitimate commerce is affected was rejected
above. As to the argument that “harmonization” of a state luring statute
with state criminal jurisdiction statutes effectively insulates the luring
statutes from review under the extraterritorial aspect of the Dormant
Commerce Clause,93 this misses the point the federal courts make in their
extraterritorial analysis of state dissemination statutes.
¶34

¶35
The federal courts’ main concern regarding extraterritorial
regulation is that an Internet user engaging in activity legal in his or her
home state faces the prospect of inadvertently subjecting himself or herself
to criminal liability in another state. For example, even though California
may lack the power to, and disclaims any intent to, regulate wholly
extraterritorial conduct under the it’s luring statute, an Internet user is not
able to exclude California residents from his communications, is not able to
prevent communications not directed at California residents from passing
through California because of the design of the Internet, and is not able to
ascertain another Internet user’s age and geography unless that information
is truthfully volunteered.94 This leaves an Internet user whose conduct is
criminal under California’s luring statute but legal in his or her home state
to be faced with the Hobson’s choice of either forgoing conduct acceptable
in his home state or exposing himself to possible criminal liability in
California.95 It is this dilemma that the federal courts in the state
dissemination cases have uniformly declared a projection of state policy
extraterritorially in violation of the Dormant Commerce Clause. 96

92

See, e.g., Hatch v. Superior Court, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d 453, 472-73 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000).
93
See id.; People v. Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d 184, 191-92 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000).
94
See Am. Library Ass’n, 969 F. Supp. at 167, 170-71.
95
See id. at 180 (describing the exposure of individuals to a Hobson’s choice).
96
See id.
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C. Inconsistent State Regulation
¶36
The California state courts are unique in having directly addressed
the question of whether a state luring statute unconstitutionally subjects
interstate commerce to inconsistent state legislation.97 In examining the
constitutionality of California’s luring statute, these courts reasoned that the
statute limits the scope of prohibited conduct to a “ban on communication
of specified matter to a minor for purposes of seduction.”98 Citing an
inability to “conceive of any legitimate commerce” which may be derived
from such conduct, the California courts concluded that there is no burden
upon interstate commerce and hence no threat of inconsistent state
legislation.99

But as noted above, this is a questionable determination and cannot
be used to avoid the analysis of whether such laws potentially subject
interstate commerce to inconsistent state legislation. What California may
deem illegitimate, another state may find legitimate, whether based upon
different age of consent laws or different definitions of prohibited conduct.
Conversely, some conduct permitted by California under their luring statute
and that may be the subject of legitimate commerce in California, other
states may find illegitimate. If “not one, but many or every, State adopted”
legislation similar to California’s luring statute, the result might be that the
Internet becomes awash in a flood of inconsistent state regulation.100
¶37

CONCLUSION
¶38
The federal and state courts that have examined the ability of states
to regulate, for the purpose of protecting minors, sexually explicit
communication conducted on the Internet have reached seemingly divergent
conclusions. State courts have claimed that certain aspects of state luring
statutes distinguish these laws from the state dissemination statutes
evaluated by the federal courts. Though the state courts’ ultimate
conclusions as to the constitutionality of state luring statutes may prove to
be correct, the reasoning used to distinguish these statutes from the federal
dissemination cases is inadequate. They have failed to properly consider
the implications raised by the variance among states regarding the scope of
prohibited conduct and defining who constitutes a minor on the Pike
balancing of local benefits against burdens on interstate commerce, the
extraterritorial effects of the luring statutes, and the specter of an
inconsistent patchwork of state Internet regulation. Consequently, the state

97

See Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471-72; Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191-92.
Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 471-72 (Cal. Ct. App. 2000) (emphasis in original).
See also Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191-92.
99
Hatch, 94 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 472-73; Hsu, 99 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 191.
100
Healy v. The Beer Inst., 491 U.S. 324, 336 (1989).
98
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courts evaluating luring statutes must delve further into the Dormant
Commerce Clause analysis then they have been thus far willing to do.

